THE COMMON SENSE, PERFECTION OF THE ORDER OF PURE SENSIBILITY

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Written in 1940 by Marshall McLuhan’s close friend and Thomist mentor Bernard J. Muller Thym, this article differentiates the common sense from the other internal senses in Thomist psychology by arguing that, unlike imagination, cogitation, and memory, the common sense participates neither in the ratio (discursive reasoning) nor in the intellectus (intellective seeing) of human apprehension. Contrary to what Aquinas’ teacher Albertus Magnus taught, the object of the common sense, Muller Thym asserts, is not the so-called “common sensibles” (such as movement, shape, and number), but rather the unified apprehension or “perfection” of the objects of the external senses. Just as the intellect is the terminus of the phantasms of the imagination, the common sense is the terminus of the proper sensibles of the external senses.

I

In order that we may make clear the peculiar glory of the common sense and of its operation in that hierarchy which obtains among the various orders of cognitions by which things are known without their matter but with the conditions of matter, it may be well to begin with a three-fold negation.

A. The names intellectus and ratio are frequently applied to various of the internal senses to indicate something of the special character of their operation by reason of their participation in the life of reason.

1. There is the imagination or fancy, that power whose object is the things of sense divorced from reference to the here and now. In this already it is assimilated to both ratio and intellectus, which all have their operation in the absence of things of sense.\(^1\) In this elevation to a greater degree of immateriality over the things of sense are gathered all the characteristics of the operations of the imagination: a) that it can recall the images of things once seen or heard, b)
that it can fashion images of things never seen or heard in that way by the
sense, c) that the phantasm, rather than the sense, is not a transient but an
enduring principle of human knowledge even as the agent intellect, \textit{virtus} of the
intellective part, is a co-principle of every intellectual operation, d) that the
singular material substance is presented in such wise that the judgments of
mathematics terminate in the imagination, whereas the judgments of physics
terminate in the sense.

Nevertheless, the imagination is always denominated \textit{intellectus} and not
\textit{ratio}.

There is not the discursiveness of ratio, as that name is proper to the third
operation of the reason, because the imagination does not work through a
manifold of sensible things in order to come to that which is its knowledge in
act.

Now the second operation of the intellect, that of composing and dividing, is
\textit{intellectus} insofar as at heart it is always the simple affirmation of the exercise of
an act of being, but it is \textit{ratio} insofar as it always does this by composing and
dividing. But the imagination does not judge upon things (I do not mean "judge"
in the sense of discern or discriminate), nor does it perform any act of
composing or dividing in such wise as to produce a cognition which is complex;
as Philoponus remarks, "\textit{neque enim aliud alij complicat; sed solos typos
sensibilium recipit.}" Thus the imagination cannot be assimilated as \textit{intellectus}
even to the second operation of the intellect.

It remains that the fancy can be named only \textit{intellectus}, and is thus likened to
the \textit{intelligentia indivisibilium} alone. St. Thomas even uses the word "simple
apprehension " in a large sense to describe its operation--\textit{ad simplicem
apprehensionem rei, qualem proponit phantasia}--and both he and Aristotle had
been forced to make clear in what the \textit{intelligentia indivisibilium} in the
imagination differ from the \textit{intelligentia indivisibilium} in the intellect; for since the
imagination still presents things under the conditions of matter, where each
individual is one in such manner that there can be a second like to it, the
imagination is an act of simple gaze at an object indivisible only in potency and
not indivisible in act.

2. Rarely, if ever, in the texts has sense memory been given the names \textit{ratio}
or \textit{intellectus}. But we must not forget that it is a kind of reason, for the most
accurate description of its activity is that which Aristotle has left us: its act is a
kind of syllogizing, and in man this introduces into the act a certain deliberative
character.
3. Thus both imagination and memory avoid participating in either the *intellectus* or *ratio* which belongs to the order of the second operation of the intellect; for imagination is assimilated only to that *intellectus* which is the act of simple gaze at actually indivisible essences, and memory participates in that *ratio* alone which is syllogizing. The cogitative sense, however, participates in the ratio both of the second and of the third order of operation of the human intellect.. In the first place, it performs a judicative act upon the useful and the harmful by way of presenting these to appetite; in the second place, it carries on that discursive activity which terminates in *εμπειρια*, *experimentum*.\(^\text{10}\)

Of the internal senses, then, the common sense alone does not participate in reason or in *intellectus*; and we should suspect that it belongs to a different order of cognition from that of imagination, sense memory, or the cogitative sense.

B. Since faculty as such is passive potency—it is, in fact, that by which the living creature participates in passive potency, since only God is His active potency and only prime matter is its passive potency—in no power can there be activity until first it will have been made to be in act. In the intellect, for example, it is not until the possible intellect will have been made to be in act by the species that it can engage on the immanent action of its own which is the enunciation of the *verbum*.

Now sense is a certain passion: its activity consists not so much in its moving as in its being moved; it is necessary, then, that the sense be in act before any sense faculty will have been placed in an order of active potency in which the sense can be active with respect to other sensible things of that same order. But one power can and does exercise an act with regard to another. Yet while it is true that the act of the common sense follows upon the external senses in act, nevertheless that which is described as the action correlative to the active potency which the animal possesses by reason of the sense in act is not any activity of the common sense, but is *cpavTau,a*. That is Aristotle’s famous definition of *φαντασια*: *κινησις υπο της αισθησεως της κατ ενεργειαν γιγνομενη*.\(^\text{11}\)

The act of sense memory is subsequent upon the things of sense, many of them presented one after another by acts of simple recall, and that act of the cogitative sense called *εμπειρια* is subsequent upon the act of memory, as ultimately induction is subsequent upon many acts which are *experimenta*. That is the famous procession described in the Posterior Analytics (II, 19): *αισυησις* -> *μνημη* -> *νους* -> *επιστημη*. But memory is not called *motus factus a phantaaia quae secundum actum*; *experimentum* is not called *motus factus a memoria*.
**quae secundum actum; induction is not called motus factus ab experimento quod secundum actum. In the midst of an excellent treatise on internal sensation John of St. Thomas remarks that phantasia in the Aristotelian definition covers the internal powers outside of the common sense.**

Perhaps this is true of fancy in a most general manner. But it is not at all true for our present concern, for memory as a further act is described as subsequent upon the fancy, so defined. Rather it must be said that fancy is a movement caused by the sense in act, because in its movement it is like to the movement of the sense, and only the fancy has this character: similia est motui sensus, et nihil aliud nisi phantasia invenitur esse tale; for fancy differs from the three acts of the external sense as effect from cause, and a cause which brings about movement insofar as it is being moved itself, causes a movement like to the movement by which it is moved. But the movement which is memory, as a kind of syllogizing, is not similar to fancy, which is a kind of simple apprehension; even more diverse is experiment from memory; and induction, which in its term surpasses the order of sense altogether, is most removed in its movement from experiment.

The question that remains, of course, is this: if the act of the sensus communis be posterior to the act of the external senses, in what may it differ from phantasia, which is a movement similar in kind to the movement in the external sense and is a movement which is an effect of the sense in act as cause?

C. The object of the common sense is not the common sensibles, communia sensibilia: movement, quiet, number, figure, magnitude, unity, time, the rough, the smooth, the acute, the obtuse, and the like.

More than one manual of psychology, as they call it, describes the object of the common sense as the communia sensibilia, apparently because it is a matter of record that there is a common sense, that there are common sensibles, and that every power is distinguished by its acts and its object. (We may point out that the correlate of that position is the equally false proposition that the common sense can perceive the common sensibles in isolation.)

The fact is that there is no text in Aristotle which can be interpreted thus and that St. Thomas has explicitly rejected that doctrine:

> Some therefore say that these common sensibles are not sensibles per accidens for two reasons: first, because these common sensibles are proper to the common sense just as the proper sensibles are proper to the single senses; secondly,
because there cannot be proper sensibles without there being common sensibles, there can however be proper sensibles without sensibles per accidens.

Both reasons, however, are insufficient: the first, because it is false that these common sensibles are the proper objects of the common sense. For the common sense is a certain potency wherein are terminated changes of all the senses, as will be shown below. It is impossible, therefore, for the common sense to have any proper object that is not the object of a proper sense. But as for the changes of the proper senses by their objects, which the proper senses cannot have, just as it [the common sense] perceives the very changes of the senses, so it distinguishes between the sensibles of the different senses. For by the common sense we perceive that we live and we distinguish between the sensibles of the different senses, for instance, between white and sweet.18

Apparently that doctrine had been taught earlier, for Avicenna attacks it as well.19

While the doctrine of the sensibilia communia as object of the common sense is found in the pseudo-thomistic opusculum De Potentiis Animae.20 Father Fabro is exactly right in concluding that the "certain ones" to whom St. Thomas refers is St. Albert the Great, on the strength of the Summa de Creaturis;21 it surely is not Averroes.22

According to St. Albert there are three acts of the common sense. The apprehension of the sensatum commune is its act per se, and it is defined by that act. The apprehension of the proper sensible befits it per posterius; but the apprehension of the acts of the external senses befits it per accidens. 23 In support of this position was the earlier text, " ... probatur per hoc quod dicit Philosophm, quod sensata communia per se sunt sensua communia." 24 As Father Fabro remarks "Truly, the phrase alluded to 25 has not been reported with entire fidelity."

The fact is that the common sensibles are not the object of any sense, and that in the text of Aristotle to which St. Albert refers the οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός makes clear that when we have sensation of the common sensibles, they do not fall within the class of the sensibilia per accidens but of the sensibilia per se. 26

There is no doubt that the position of St. Thomas rather than that of St. Albert is the true one. But because the authority of St. Albert is great, it must be shown how he was forced to teach that the object of the common sense is the common sensibles, in the face of the text of Aristotle and of the multitude of

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Greek and Arabian commentators to whom both he and St. Thomas owed so much.  

In the course of another enquiry we found it necessary to explain at some length St. Albert’s teaching on the *totum potestativum*, on the nature of the soul and its faculties. We must recall that doctrine briefly.

“1. The soul in itself is substance and is subsistence, altogether apart from and distinct from body. So considered the soul exists with the existence only of its highest part, in whose supreme unity and power all the lower parts are contained without distinction.

“2. It is the same soul which under another consideration acts as form and produces esse for that of which it is the form by a diffusion of itself in the informed thing; to speak more exactly, the diffusion is esse. From the one, solitary, supreme subsistence which is the soul and its highest part emanate lower forms in tum, which also give to each of the parts they inform its esse. This is all described in such way that there is only one substantial form and one esse, the function of that form in the sense of an activity which form exercises as form; and yet in regard of the *quod est*, in which that unique esse is diffused, the very same esse is multiple, since it has been multiplied according to the number of existents to which it is the esse.

“3. The relation of superior to inferior in this system of formalities is that of the *quo est* or esse to the *quod est*, of that which is formal to that which is material; their union is the unity of act and potency, of that form which in the thing corresponds to the intention which is the specific difference to that matter which in the thing corresponds to that intention which is the genus.”

The order of descent of “forms” in man follows this pattern: rationality, rational animal, rational sensible vegetable. But within each order is to be discovered a similar descent, with the lower related to the higher as matter to form or as *quod est* to *quo est*. In the intellective order, for example, the possible intellect flows out of the *quod est* of the soul and the agent intellect (the *unum formalisaimum*, that which *absolute et simpliciter est substantia hominis*) flows out of *quo est*. We should expect St. Albert to have continued that descent in a description of sensibility; and when we find many texts in which he speaks of the common sense as the one most formal part of the sense order, we are on sure ground. In the same way, among the external senses vision is the most formal, for by reason of its excellence, its knowing many proper and common sensibles, it is more apt " ad notitiam quae est per inventionem."
the sense of touch, as Aristotle and St. Thomas also taught, is closer to the common sense; whence the sense of touch is founded on the power of the common sense, which is the source whence it flows *formaliter*-in the manner of descent of form. And when the common sense, the *principium* and *fons* of the sense order, is described related to the external senses as the *commune* to the *particulare*, as form to matter at least in the judgment it passes on the action of the external sense, there can be little doubt that we are looking at a further elaboration of the same pattern of descent in forms.

At this point, however, St. Albert was faced with a problem which he was the first to recognize.

The common sense must keep a certain formality, community, and universality; that community, however, could not be the community of a genus, for the community of that which is most formal is as that of a *differentia*, convertible with the thing defined; this had been his constant teaching on the soul and on the *forma totiua*. Let us consider this alternative: if the common sense enjoyed the community of that which is as the ultimate difference, then it would have to be a whole, a *totum potestativum*; in no animal, above all not in man, is this true. Faced with the necessity of having something in which to root the community and formality of the common sense, St. Albert turned to the community of object; and so he made the common sensibles the object of the common sense. That is the force of the capital text:

> Therefore it may be asked, why is it called common? It is not called common as a genus nor as an integral whole or *totum potestativum*. If it were common as a genus it would be predicated of each of the proper senses, which is false; if as a whole, then its essence would be nothing outside the essence of the proper senses, just as the essence of the whole is nothing outside of the parts constituting it. Therefore it remains that its community must be on the part of the object.

This position based on a descent in formalities of the object had its own consequences. The first was the enumeration of the three acts of the common sense already mentioned, these acts arranged according to the priority of one over another. We have already considered texts to the effect that if the common sensibles of themselves were the object of any faculty they could be perceived only accidently by another; St. Albert could not allow exactly this conclusion, both because he wished to be faithful to Aristotle (for whom the common sensibles are *sensibilia per se*) and because it was necessary that the common sensibles be *sensibilia per se* in order that the common sensibles be diffused.
through the external senses by a descent of forms. Hence he introduced the interpretation that if the common sensibles of themselves were the object of any external sense, they could be perceived by another external sense only accidentally. Even as the soul, one in essence and existence, by a descent or a diffusion (esse) is a manifold of powers, so the first sensible, object of the common sense, is many in its descent and in its esse diversum, for “unus actus per se est inius potentiae, sedp lures per posterius.”

It is necessary to understand that St. Albert has taken his position not as the result of an exegesis on the text of Aristotle, not of an independent analysis of the character of sensibility, not of any personal observation; rather is it a position, and the only one, he thought he could adopt in order to avoid a difficulty generated by his own theory of being. We may return to our main line of argument.

It remains that when Aristotle says that there are three kinds of sensibles, two per se and one per accidens, we must understand simply that the two kinds of sensibilia per se are the sensibilia propria and the sensibilia communia. Thus from the outset magnitude, number and the rest are perceived per se by the external sense, although only in terms of that which is its proper object.

Should one ask where in the life of sense the common sensibles are presented for the first time in isolation, we must say in the imagination, not that the object of the imagination is the common sensibles, but because within the new level of "intelligibility" established in function of the object of the intellectus passivus magnitude, number and the rest can be presented as in materia intelligibilis signata in isolation from materia sensibilis signata upon which they do not depend.

For the whole order of sense, always confined to things in their individuality, is more concerned with the accidents of things, as against the intellect which looks rather to essence and to substance. But in material things there is a certain order of accidents, such that the first accident of matter is quantity (to which in one way or another belong all the common sensibles-St. Thomas seems to give priority to magnitude; Avicenna does give it to number); upon quantity follow and in it are received all the other accidents of matter. And the irreducible priority is that which substance enjoys in its absolute consideration; this is attained to only by intellect.

Now because that which is properly intellect is the intellect, and the imagination is named intellect only in its ordering to this, so is matter named materia intelligibilis ultimately from the absolute consideration of material substance made by the intellect. Hence the text we have been analyzing
continues: “Et de his abstractis est mathematica quae considerat quantitates, et ea quae quantitates consequuntur, ut figuram, et hujusmodi.”

But the order of singulars that mathematics considers falls beneath the imagination, exceeding that which falls beneath the sense and not attaining to that which the intellect alone can consider. And so the intelligible matter in which the judgments of mathematics terminate must be matter as it can be known by that intellect which is the intellectua passivus.

The imagination, then, and not the common sense, ushers in an order of cognoscibility between the pure sensibility of the external sense and the formal intelligibility of the intellect.

These negations we have made about the common sense:

A. that it is neither intellectus nor ratio by participation,

B. that its act is not caused by the sense in act in such wise that a new level of intelligibility is attained in its object, wherefore

C. its object is not the common sensibles – all come to the one truth, that the common sense in its operation dwells at the level of pure sensibility with which the external senses each has been already actually concerned. It remains, then, that we describe its function within the economy of that which is sensible and is nothing more.

II

If we had never been presented with the problem of how the infra-intelligible world of sense could be made to be actually intelligible, it might well happen that we should never come to know the agent intellect; yet from that beginning we grow to the realization that the agent intellect is a co-principle of the entire intellectual order, and more and more we are struck with wonder at the contemplation of what it is to be always in act by essence. A comparison would not be altogether valid for the common sense, both because there is nothing at all in the order of sense like an agent sense, and because we do have awareness of the act of the common sense. Nevertheless there is this measure of truth, that from a rather simple beginning of knowledge about the common sense, we may come to a remarkable realization of what it is to enjoy the perfection of the order of pure sensibility.

Part of the basic argument of Aristotle and St. Thomas is well enough known. Each sense can discern differences contained under its own proper object; but sight is not capable of judging of the sweet, which it perceives per accidens, nor taste of the white, which it perceives per accidens; but in terms of that which are had diversely as the white and the sweet, and as following upon the act of the

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external sense, it is necessary that there be a sense which apprehends in the manner of one that which in the external senses is many; this is the common sense. Thus its object is that perceived as one which the external senses perceive as many, and its relation to the external sense is that of term to principle.

So evident a case is this of the principle that the higher the level of being at which a thing exists the more does it possess its power in a unified manner, that St. Thomas employs the common sense as an example in at least three other instances: 1) to show that separate intellective substances, angels, know singular things through forms which demonstrate both the universal and the particular as we humans know these; 2) to show that God is the purest truth; 3) to show that although even the highest of natural human knowledges suffers division at least into the speculative and the practical, revealed theology does not, for it is “velut quaedam impressio divinae scientiae, quae est una et simplex omnium.”

Aristotle had spoken of the common sense as like to a point, either one or two, for a point is one as the terminus of a line but is two as that shared in common by two lines which coincide. As the text of Aristotle suggests, St. Thomas in one place interprets this apparently as a point which is the term of two lines distinguished by section, and in this follows Simplicius. On this M. DeCorte remarks, “We believe with the greater number of the ancient commentators, that it is necessary to see in this point the center of the circle and not, with Simplicius and St. Thomas, the point that segments a line.” Upon this comment we would pass two remarks, 1) that the force of the example would be utterly the same, though not so telling perhaps, had St. Thomas confined himself to this one exegesis, and 2) that St. Thomas later in the De Anima does speak of the common sense as the center in which all lines terminate. And to the list of commentators we may add another example from Philoponus, one from Avicenna, one from Averroes; St. Albert also followed Avicenna in interpreting the example as the center of a circle; in one place he also makes it the center point which divides the diameter of a circle.

Point as term of a line, however, is only a weak example of term as term is related to principle among knowledges. Hence St. Thomas adds to the example of the center point of a circle the observation that the common sense is one in respect of all sensibles as the intellect is the term of all phantasms. And this is profoundly true. Still the intellect exceeds altogether the order of the phantasm, and although it is true that the common sense exceeds the external senses in its operation, still its object is the sensible in relation to the external senses whose object is some proper sensible. We may understand the common sense as term.
better if we can find another proportion of principle to term among things at the same level of cognoscibility.

The one clear instance, one we cannot avoid, is that of the two-fold operation of intellect:

\[
\text{Respondeo dicendum, quod in qualibet cognitione duo est considerare, scilicet principium, et finem sive terminum.}
\]
\[
Principium quidem ad apprehensionem pertinet, terminus autem ad judicium; ibi enim cognitio perfectur. \quad 63
\]

Now the intellect, whose object is being, encompasses that object variously in its acts; for the object of the first act is being in its limit, essence, whereas the object of the second operation is being in that which is the exercise of the act of being, esse.\textsuperscript{64} In the order of generation the first act must precede the second, as the imperfect is always prior to the perfect; but it is impossible that the thing, which exists at the very same level of intelligibility in both acts, enter that imperfect cognition which is simple apprehension without somehow attaining to the perfect stature of intelligibility gained in the second operation. Thus it is that although a universal concept is formed from particulars by induction, the term of induction is the \textit{intellectus principiorum}.\textsuperscript{65}

We are now able to establish the ratio:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{movement of external sense} & \quad \overset{\text{intelligentia indivisibilium}}{\longrightarrow} \\
\text{movement of common sense} & \quad \overset{\text{operatio componentis et dividendis}}{\longrightarrow} \\
\text{principium} & \quad \overset{\text{terminus}}{\longrightarrow} \\
\end{align*}
\]

And because

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{movement of the external sense} & \quad \overset{\text{the movement of the common sense}}{\longrightarrow} \\
\text{the external sense} & \quad \overset{\text{the common sense}}{\longrightarrow} \\
\end{align*}
\]

we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{external sense} & \quad \overset{\text{intelligentia indivisibilium}}{\longrightarrow} \\
\text{common sense} & \quad \overset{\text{operatio componentis et dividendis}}{\longrightarrow} \\
\text{principium} & \quad \overset{\text{terminus}}{\longrightarrow} \\
\end{align*}
\]

For this reason St. Thomas is always insistent that the community of the common sense is not the community of a genus,\textsuperscript{66} is not the community of indetermination and of that which is on the side of matter; but in this sense of the word "common " which bears on the perfect, as against the imperfect, state of cognoscibility, in what we believe is a unique text St. Thomas calls the term of

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intellectual knowledge the common operation of intellect: "... quantum ad operationem communem intellectus, quae est compotio et divisio."\(^{67}\)

Perhaps we must make clear that in no sense do we say the common sense participates in intellect, or its object in anything of intelligibility; we have been studying it with the technique of analogy in order better to understand what it is to be the term of cognition.

We may go a step further by the use of the same method. There are various ways in which anything may terminate in something; for term signifies that which is ultimate in regard of anything.\(^{68}\) There may be that which is term of a magnitudesurface for body, point for line.\(^{69}\) Term may be the extreme of movement or action, as esse is the term of generation;\(^ {70}\) and here much more is the principle operative that term is nobler than that which is terminated as container than thing contained. Again, the constitutive difference is the term of the essence of the species.\(^ {71}\) But if we consider cognition, there is between the cognoscibile and the cognoscens the proportion of form to matter, of maker to thing made, of act to its potency.\(^ {72}\) Thus it is necessary that that which is a term of cognition be term in function of that which is term of the thing known, for cognition takes place by the assimilation of knower to thing known.\(^ {73}\)

Now the term of the common sense so understood is the sensible, that is, both the sensible in the manifold of the external senses and above all the sensible, common not with the community of a genus or of a predicate, but with the community of the form of a higher order which possesses as one what is shared by many forms of a lower order; moreover, the term of the second operation of the intellect is ipsum esse rei. On the strength of our original proportions, then, if we consider this ultimate signification of term, we shall derive the ratio:

\[
\frac{\text{the common sense}}{\text{the sensible, common with the community of form}} = \frac{\text{second operation of intellect}}{\text{ipsum esse rei}}
\]

There is a certain circularity in knowledge of all orders, which is more or less complete according to the degree of immanence in the activity of the knower; in the intellect that return of knowledge is complete insofar as the intellect knows what it knows and in the same act knows its own act and the proportion of its act to the thing known, in which proportion the ratio of truth consists; whence there is truth in the intellect. But the sense knows what it knows, as it also knows its own act, but it does not know the nature of that act to be conformed
to the things it knows; whence there is only a partial or incomplete return of the sense upon itself.\textsuperscript{74}

It would appear, however, that since such reflection characterizes knowledge in the full enjoyment of the cognoscibility of its object, we find any power making that sort of return upon itself only in the act in which it attains its object in the integral cognoscibility of that order of knowledge. Thus while truth is in the intellect rather than in the sense, truth is in the intellect only in its second operation, for there alone does the intellect have something proper to itself;\textsuperscript{75} for the intellect is moved at once to that term of reflexive knowledge, the knowing of the truth by which it judges, only in the act in which it attains to the ultimate act of being and the ultimate principle of intelligibility, esse; for “\textit{veritas fundatur magis in esse rei quam in quidditate}.”\textsuperscript{76}

The sense, we have just remarked, does make a partial return insofar as the animal knows that it sees, hears and the like. That knowledge, however, both Aristotle and St. Thomas clearly affirm is had not in the act of vision or of hearing; for it is not by sight that the animal sees that it sees, but by that power named the common sense.\textsuperscript{77} It should be well understood that there is no process to infinity in such wise that another sense be necessary in order to know the act of the common sense, even as only the common sense can know the acts (\textit{immutationes}) of the external senses; for we are dealing with a series of ordered causes, and that the common sense knows vision, as well as that it knows its own act, is something which accrues to it by reason of its being the term of the order of knowledge concerned with pure sensibility.

Moreover, although \textit{phantasia} - at least as the act of imagination - ushers in a new order of “intelligibility,” still insofar as fancy is \textit{motus factus a sensu secundum actum} and in this movement is like to the movements in the external sense, the acts of the fancy are also known by the common sense.\textsuperscript{78} And thus in sleep, although the senses be bound and impeded in their action, so that there is no act of the external sense to terminate in the common sense, if anything remains of the activity of the common sense, it is that it knows the act of fancy; for it sees that the things which are seen are dreams, as discerning between things and the likenesses of things.\textsuperscript{79}

This is the glory of the common sense as the common root and principle of the sense life, that which is term in the realm of pure sensibility, without which there could not be any sensation or any order of things sensible.
Our inquiry has thus come to its conclusion; we should wish here to conclude its summary exposition as well, for men who have the philosophic temper and the *habitus* of metaphysics will realize quite well the significance of this mode of study.

Yet in our day there are many writers who find themselves in this case: they have not realized that in every enunciation the intellect expresses the exercise of an act of being; they have not realized that the thomistic metaphysics is always a metaphysics of things in function of their "to be," their esse, that is, in function of the exercise of that act; they have allowed themselves to be seduced into calling into doubt the existence of things in such wise that that existence would then have to be reconstructed by way of discovering an existence surely known in one case and thence proved successively for each given case. In these straits they postulate some sort of initial, primary, irreducible knowledge of "self" and call this knowledge an existential experience. This is a pure position, let us remark, and no amount of meditation thereon can give it the character of a rational evidence, for it contains no element of problem or of mystery. Like every pure position, however, it may be used: indeed, it would seem that it is with the

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use in view that the postulate has been formed. From this "experience" of "existence" are deduced variously categories of being, existence of the world of sense, and divers other things. The whole system of deductions is called, not too happily, an existential metaphysic. In a way, then, we are forced to add a further word.

It should be evident that at the same time we have been studying the common sense as term of the order of pure sensibility, an induction has been going on, which, though conducted through relatively few instances, has not been incomplete. Perhaps we should suggest the following principles which may not have remained altogether implicit at the conclusion even of that partial induction:

1. Of knowledges specified within the same order of cognoscibility, one of which is as principle and the other as term, the reflexivity appropriate to the given order of knowledge is realized in that knowledge which is term, in function of its being term.

2. Of knowledges so related as principle and term, the terminal knowledge is term in function of the object in the exercise of the ultimate act of that order of things cognoscible.

3. The reflexivity realized in that knowledge which is term exists in function of the object in the exercise of the ultimate act of that order of things cognoscible.

Notes


2 διο ουδεποτε νοει ανευ φαντασματος η ψυχη (Aristotelis, De An., m, 8, 48la16- l 7). Ad quintum dicendum, quod phantasma est principium nostrae cognitionis, ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio non sicut transiens, sed sicut permanens, ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis: sicut principia demonstrationis oportet manere in omni processu scientiae, cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut objecta, in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit vel secundum perfectam representationem, vel secundum negationem ... (S. Thomae, in Boet. de Trin., VI, i, ad 5, ed. Mandonnet, p. 184).

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3 . . . ; et ideo anima virtutem habet per quam facit species sensibiles esse intelligibiles actu, quae est intellectus agens; et habet virtutem per quam est in potentia, ut efficiatur in actu determinatae cognitionis a specie rei sensibilis, factae intelligibilis actu: et haec virtus vel potentia dicitur intellectus possibilis: et harum duarum virtutum operationes sequitur omne nostrum intelligere, tam principiorum, quam conclusionum; ... (S. Thomae, in II Sent., d. 17, q. i, a. I, resp., ed. Mandonnet, p. 428).


5 Cf. S. Thomae, De Verit., 15, I ad 5; ibid., resp.; op. cit., 1, 12 resp.

6 Quod igitur dicit, hoc est quia ipsa quidem secundum se fantasia neque affirmat aliquid neque negat. Neque enim aliud alij complicat, sed solos typos sensibilium recipit (Ioannis Grammatici, super III de Anima [ed. Marcel De Corte, Le Commentaire de Jean Philopon sur le Troisieme Livre du “Traite de l’Ame” d’Aristote, Liege/Paris, 1984, p. 88. 86-84. 3]).

7 . . . Sed ad phantasiam non sequitur passio in appetitu; quia dum aliquid apparat nobis secundum phantasiam, similiter nos habemus, ac si consideremus in pictura aliqua terribilia vel sperabilia; ergo opinio none est idem quod phantasia. Huius autem differentiae ratio est, quia appetitus non patitur neque movetur ad simplicem apprehensionem rei, quae proponit phantasia. Sed oportet quod apprehendatur sub ratione boni vel mali, convenientis vel nocivi. Et hoc facit opinio in hominibus, componendo et dividendo, dum opinatur hoc esse terribile vel malum. Illud autem esse sperabile vel bonum. Phantasia autem non componit neque dividit (S. Thomae, in De An., III, 4, nos. 684-685; we have added the italics in this text). Cf.: Deinde cum dicit “est autem” ostendit differentiam inter phantasiam et intellectum. Et primo quantum ad operationem communem intellectus, quae est compositio et divisio; dicens quod phantasia est alterum ab affirmatione vel negatione intellectus; quia in complexione intelligibilium iam est verum et falsum: quod non est in phantasia. Nam cognoscere verum et falsum est solius intellectus (op. cit., III, I3, n. 793).

8 τα δε πρωτα νοηματα τινι διωσει του μη φαντασματα ειναι΄η ουδε ταλλα φαντασματα, αλλ ουκ ανευ φαντασματων (De Anima Γ. 8, 432a12-14) . Cf. the comment of St. Thomas on this text: Inquirit in quo differant primi intellectus, idest intelligentiae indivisibilium, cum non sint phantasmata. Et respondet, quod non sunt sine phantasmaticus, sed tamen non sunt phantasmata, quia phantasmata sunt similitudines particularium, intellecta autem sunt universalia ab individuantibus conditionibus abstracta: unde phantasmata sunt indivisibilia in potentia, et non in actu (in De An., III, I3, n. 794).


11 *De Anima*, Γ. 3, 429a1; cf. *Rhet.*, A. 11, 1370a28. The quotation occurs many times in St. Thomas, e. g., *in Phys.*, VIII, 6; *in de Sensu et Sensato*, i, n. 811; *in de An.*, II, 4, n. 265; III, 6, n. 659; III, 13, n. 792, etc.


13 Memoria enim sequitur phantasiam, quae est motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut habetur in secundo de Anima (S. Thomae, *in Met.*, I, 1, n. IO). St. Thomas’s reference is to the second and not the third book of the De Anima, because in the arabic-latin translation that accompanied the translation of the commentary of Averroes, the third book begins at book III, chapter 4, 429a10 of the Greek text. In his own commentary on the *De Anima* St. Thomas begins the third book at 424b22.

14 Ex omnibus autem concludit, quod phantasia. sit quidam motus causatus a sensu secundum actum; qui quidem motus non est sine sensu, neque potest inesse his quae non sentiunt. Quia si aliquis motus fit a sensu secundum actum, similis est motui sensus, et nihil aliud nisi phantasia invenitur esse tale. Relinquitur ergo, quod phantasia sit huiusmodi motus. Et ex hoc quod est motus causatus a sensu, similis ei, . . . (S. Thomae, *in De An.*, III, 6, n. 659).


16 Deinde proponit quod ab actu sensus contingit quemdam motum fieri. Quod quidem manifestum fit ex eo quod primo proponebatur, scilicet quod ab eo quod est motum, contingit moveri alterum. Sensus autem secundum actum fit, ex eo quod movetur a sensibilius; unde relinquitur t quod a sensu secundum actum causetur aliquis motus. Ex quo etiam manifestum est, quia motus causatur ab actu sensus, necesse est quod sit similis sensui, quia omne agens agit simile sibi. Unde et illud, quod movet inquantum movetur, causat motum similem motui quo ipsum movetur (*Ibid.*—n. 658)

17 A representative list will be found on p. 82 sqq. of the excellent study by Fr. Cornelio Fabro, "Il Problema della Percezione Sensoriale," *Bollettino Filosofico* IV, I (1938), 5-62.

Some modern commentators have come to this conclusion as the result of a mistaken reading of an admittedly difficult text in Aristotle: ταυτα γαρ παντα κινησει αισυανομεθα, οιον μεγεθος κινησει (*De Anima*, r. 1, 425a16-17). (Among them is the author of a rather good Latin manual of "psychologia metaphysica" which appeared in a new edition in 1989.) The argument runs thus: we perceive magnitude and all the common sensibles by motion; but the common sense perceives motion, for it perceives the movements of the external senses; therefore the common sense perceives the common sensibles distinctly.

The difficulty, of course, has risen over an equivocation in the word motion, κινησις.

The text of the De Anima says that we perceive all the common sensibles by a movement; i. e. 1) we perceive all the common sensibles, of which movement is one, by a movement, and 2) we perceive all the common sensibles by a movement and not by movement (which is one of the common sensibles). There is nothing in Aristotle to show
that movement enjoys any priority over magnitude; rather all the texts on the continuum, time, and the like are to the contrary effect; for magnitude comprehends all continua, e.g., movement and time (Phys. IV. 1, 220b24; VI. 2, 232a24). There is precisely a question of such priority here, for the text continues ῖστε καὶ σχῆμα μεγεθὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα . . . κ. τ. λ. i.e., we perceive figure also by a movement, for figure is somehow posterior to magnitude.

It remains that by κίνησις, we must understand the movement, immutatio, which is sensation. Hence the text says we (i.e. the senses, the external senses as well as the common sense) perceive all the common sensibles, even as we perceive the proper sensibles, by a kind of immutation, since both the common and proper sensibles are sensibilia per se.

The exact reading of the text has not escaped St. Thomas: Quaecumque enim sentiuntur per hoc quod immutat sensum, sentiuntur per se et non secundum accidentem. Nam hoc est per se sentire, pati aliquid a sensibili. Sed omnia haec sensibilia, per immutacionem quamdam sentiuntur. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod haec omnia sentimus "motu," idest quadam immutacione. Manifestum est enim quod magnitudo immutat sensum, cum sit subjectum qualitatis sensibilis puta coloris aut saporis, et qualitates non agunt sine suis subjectis. Ex quo appareat, quod figuram etiam cognoscimus cum quadam immutacione, quia figura est aliquid magnitudinis, quia consistit in conterminacione magnitudinis. Est enim figura quae termino vel terminis continetur, ut dicitur in 1 Euclidis (in De An., III, I, no. 577).

18 Dicunt igitur quidam, quod hujusmodi communia sensibilia non sunt sensibilia per accidentem, propter duas rationes. Primo quidem, quia hujusmodi sensibilia communia sunt propria sensui communi, sicut sensibilia propria sunt propria singulis sensibus. Secundo, quia sensibilia propria non possunt esse sine sensibilibus communibus; possunt autem esse sine sensibilibus per accidentem.


19 lam autem putaverunt aliqui hominum quod haec sensihilia communia habent sensum existentem in animalibus in quo conveniunt: et a quo apprehenduntur. sed non est ita. tu enim scis quod quaedam ex his apprehenduntur per colorem: qui si non essent: non apprehenderentur: et quaedam apprehenduntur per tactum. qui si non essent non apprehenderentur. si autem possibile esset aliquod istorum apprehendi sine mediante qualitate quae est primum apprehensum ab allo istorum sensuum. tunc esset hoc possibile. sed uti nobis sit impossibile apprehendere illud nisi mediante
apprehendente quod apprehendit sensu cognitio. aut significatione sive mediante sensu. hoc non habet sensum communem ullo modo (Avicennæ, Lib. VI Naturalium III. 8, ed. Venet. (1508) fol. 17rb). Sensus autem qui est communis alius ab eo quem tenent illi: qui putaverunt quod sensibilia communia haberent sensum communem (op. cit. IV, I, fol. 17rbA).

20 Chapter 4, ed. Mandonnet, p. 858.
21 Cornelio Fabro, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
22 The common sensibles are proper to the common sense only in the way that they are proper to the external senses, i.e., both the common sensibles and the proper sensibles are sensibilia per se: Cum declaravit duos modos sensibilium per se, scilicet pròprìorum et communium, incepit declarare tertium modum, qui est sensibilis per accidens. . . Et etiam sensibilia communia, ut declarabitur, sunt pròprìa sensui communi, quemadmodum ista sunt pròprìa unicuique sensuum, quod est communem per accidens. . . Et etiam sensibilia communia, ut declarabitur, sunt pròprìa sensui communi, quemadmodum ista sunt pròprìa unicuique sensuum: . . . (Averrois Cordubensis, super II de Anima, text. et com. 65, ed. Venet. apud luntas [1550-52] fol. 189va). The other relevant texts are the commentaries on texts ISS and 184. For the benefit of those to whom the best edition is not available we cite these texts:

Et etiam impossibile est aliud sentiens esse a quinque sensibus, ita quod sensibile eius est aliquid unum sensibilium communium, sub quibus sunt sensibilia pròprìa unicuique sensuum quinque, nisi sensibilia essent communia unicuique sensuum accidentaliter. et dicit hoc, quia, si essent eis accidentaliter, contingere ut essent alicui sensui essentieliter. quod enim invenitur alicui accidentaliter, debet inveniri alij essentialiter.

Deinde dicit verbi gratia motui et cetera idest et sensibilia communia non sunt comprehensa a quinque sensibus accidentaliter, verbi gratia motus, et quies, et figura, et quantitas, et numerus. omnia enim ista sentiuntur a quinque sensibus per aliam motionem, et passionem. et quod est ita necesse est ut sit essentialiter. Deinde dicit, verbi gratia quantitas etc., idest verbi gratia quantitas. sensus enim innati sunt comprehendere eam per aliquam passionem vel motus, et similiter est de figura. figura enim est quantitas cum aliqua qualitate. Deinde dicit. quies autem non per motum, etcetera idest comprehensio autem quietis est per comprehensio privationis continui; quod est magnitudo et iam declaratum est quod continuum comprehenditur essentialiter; ergo et sua privatio comprehenditur essentialiter (op. cit. text. et com. 133, fol. 153ra; it should be remarked how much in agreement the text of St. Thomas in De An., III, 1, part of which is cited in note 17 above, is with the commentary of Averroes).

Et, cum declaratum est quod communia sensibilia comprehenduntur (sic) a quinque sensibus essentialiter, manifestum est quod impossibile est sensum proprium esse alicuius istorum sensibilium communium, verbi gratia motus, aut quantitas. quoniam, si ita esset, tunc sentiremus motum, aut sibi similes de sensibilibus communibus, non per se, sed per medium: sicut comprehendimus per visum hoc esse dulce mediante colore (op. cit., text. et com. 184, fol. 158rb).


25 των δε κοινων ηδη εχομεν αισθησιν κοινην ου κατα συμβεβηκος (*De Anima.*, Γ. 1, 425a27).

26 Deinde cum dicit "at vero," quia posset aliquis dicere, quod est aliquis sensus cognoscitivus sensibilium communium: excludit hoc tali ratione. Quicquid cognoscitur ab uno sensu, ut proprium sensibile ejus, non cognoscitur ab aliis sensibus, nisi per accidens: sed sensibilia communia non sentiuntur per accidens ab aliquo sensuum, sed per se a pluribus: sensibilia igitur communia non sunt propria objecta alicujus sensus (S. Thomae, *in De An.*, III, 1, n. 575). It is true, however, that this text says principally that the common sensibles are not the object of any external sense.

27 That the debt of thirteenth century Christian philosophers to the Arabian commentators is particularly great in the matter of the internal senses has been demonstrated by Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Sense in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosphic Texts,' Harvard Theological Review, XXVIII, i (1966), 69-133.


29 Op. cit., pp. 55-56. It is really important to study the texts of St. Albert presented in this chapter, as a result of whose analysis these conclusions have been reached; for in the development of the present argument we must regard the basic doctrine as established, in order that we may avoid constant references to our monograph.

30 S. Alberti M., *De Anima*, III, tr. 5, c. 4.

31 S. Alberti M., *S. de Creat.*, II, q. 56, a. 1 ad 1, B35. 478b.

32 E. g., the text of Aristotle ἐστι δε τισ και κοινη δυναμισ αχολουσθα πασαις St. Albert interpolates thus: Est autem quaedam communis et formalis potentia quae sequitur omnes . . . (*De Somno et Vigilia*, I, tr. 2, c. 1, B9. 138a); . . . sensus enim communis qui formalis est, ... (*De An.*, II, tr. 4, c. 8, B5.306a); Sed ad hujus solutionem hoc oportet supponere quod inferior ostendemus, quod scilicet somnus sit in animali secundum primum sensum, quod est sensus communis, et hoc est, quod comparat sensata particularia ad propria, sicut prius diximus in libro de Anima. Cum autem spiritus sit formarum sensibilium vehiculum, et recurvit spiritus ad interiora, virtus vecta ad interius adhuc comparat ea sicut primum: et tunc magis quando ab exterioribus abstrahitur et abducitur: et quoad hoc solum dicitur, quod somnus est recursus sensus communis ad interiora: quia virtus spiritus sequens ipsam recurrat ad primum ejus principium, quod est quasi cor. Nec est intelligendum hoc de potentia animae, quae vocatur sensus communis: haec enim est sita in organo.
suo sicut visiva virtus in oculo, sed intelligitur de virtute quae influit super instrumentum, et de forma quae formaliter sensus communis vocatur: illa enim adhuc interiora retracta sensus communis objectum est, et discernit eam sensus communis (De Somno et Vigilia, I, tr. 1, c. 9, B9. 135b-136a; we have added the italics). In this text the primum sensum and the form called common sensing is the common sensibles, and, as he says, this form is the object of the common sense; why St. Albert attributes the formality to the object of the common sense will become clear in the course of this exposition.

33 De Sensu et Sensato, tr. 1, c. 2, B9.4a. The text continues (B9.4b): ...propter quod etiam formalissimus sensuum est visus. Cf. also: De An., II, tr. 4, c. 11, text. et com. 147, B5.310b.

34 virtus ipsa fundatur supra virtutem sensus communis qui est suum principium unde fluxit formaliter: ... (De Somno et Vigilia, I, tr. 2, c. 1, B9.138b).

35 Sunt omnes sensus unum in forma virtutis sensitivae, quae fons est virtutem (sic) sensuum particularium: et ipsi particularis sensus sunt sicut rivi ex communi fonte derivati: et hoc sensu communi est judicium circa particulariores actiones quae sunt sensuum particularium: et hoc modo reflectitur virtus sensitiva super se, quando ju dicat de seipsa: sensus enim communis qui f ormalis est, reflectitur super particularem judicando sensibiliter de actione et operatione ejus. Et hoc modo nihil prohibet quando idem sit activum et passivum: agere enim quoddam est judicare et componendo et dividendo, et hoc est communis sensus, qui est formalis: recipere autem et habere formas sensibiles est pati, et hoc est sensuum particularium (De An., II, tr. 4, c. 8, B5.306a). For the commune and particulare, cf. B. J. Muller-Thym, op. cit., p. 62.

36 . . . : sicut enim in libro de Anima dictum est, sensus communis se habet ut forma, et sensus proprius ut materia in judicio sensibilium: ... (De Somno et Vigilia, I, tr. I, c. 9, B9. 136b).

37 Quaeritur ergo, Quare dicitur communis? Non enim dicitur communis ut genus, neque ut totum integrale sive potestativum. Si enim esset communis ut genus, praedicaretur de singulis propriis, quod falsum est. Si vero ut totum tunc sua essentia nihil esset extra essentiam propriorum sensuum, sicut essentia totius nulla est extra suas partes constituentes ipsum. Ergo relinquuit, quod communitas ipsius sit ex parte objecti. (S. Alberti M., S. de Creat., II q. 35, a. 2, B35.312b). The text continues in the solutio: Concedimus has ultimas rationes ostendentes quare sensus dicatur communis. Cf. also: Propter hoc dicimus ad hoc et his similia omnia, quod sensus communis est una numero forma quae est universalis non ut praedicabile: sed sicut causa formaliter praebens ea quae oriuntur ex ipsa: ... (De An., II, tr. 4, c. 12, B5.312b; one should consult the rest of this long and remarkable text). We can observe certain points of doctrine in which St. Thomas continues the work of his teacher. For example, in the De Ente et Essentia he continues the teaching of St. Albert on the forma totius in this, that since no integral part is predicated of its whole, and since, e. g., "animality " is predicated of the whole "man," the genus, differentia, and species must each be a forma totius; but the other half of St. Albert’s doctrine on the forma totius he rejects.
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(Cf., e.g., S. Thomae, Quodl., II, 2, 4 resp. "Dicunt autem quidam, quod forma partis . . . sed compositum ex materia et forma" reports St. Albert exactly and destroys his position.) Here appears a similar case. When St. Thomas says that the common sense is common not with the community of a genus (e.g., Summa Theol., I, q. 78, a. 4 ad I) he has taken just this much and no more from St. Albert.

38 The text of the Summa de Creaturia cited in note ts above. Cf. also: Ad alium dicendum quod sensatum commune per se est sensus communis, secundum quod per se dicit immediatum, quod non vi alterius facit sensum, per posterius autem est sensuum propriorum, sicut visus, quia primo et per se accipit albedinem, et posterius accipit figuram et magnitudinem albi, quia in magnitudine album est sicut in subjecto (Op. cit., q. 34, a. 2 ad 2, B35.299b).

39 S. Alberti M., De An., II, tr. 4, c. 6, B5.300b.

40 Dicamus ergo secundum praedicta, quod virtutis unius quae secundum essentiam et esse est eadem, non potest esse operatio super duo: sensitivum autem primum non est tale, sed essentialiter est unum, et secundum esse diversificatur: et ideo operatio ejus existens est una secundum quod comparatur ad essentiam ipsius primi sentientis, sed efficitur plures ex parte qua est in esse diverso secundum quod comparatur ad sensuum proprios, sicut centrum unum in essentia existens, plura est secundum esse terminando et principiendo lineas quae egrediuntur ex ipsa: et haec solutio est Averrois et Alfarabii, et est bona (S. Alberti M., De Sensu et Sensato). One may well wonder whether St. Albert has taken any more from Averroes than the elaboration of the image of the center and the radii of the circle.

41 Alberti M., S. de Creat., II, q. 36, a. 1, sol. ad obj. 2 et 3, B35.320a. Another interesting point: many times St. Albert repeats the dictum phantasia est motus factus a sensu secundum actum; yet that formula was far too vague to express the relation between the knowledges of fancy, the common sense and the external sense. It is gratifying, then, to find him modifying this saying of Aristotle: Diximus autem in libro de Anima, quod "phantasia est passio sensus communis sicut efficientis: " quoniam est motus et passio a sensu communi facta (De Memoria et Reminiscentia, tr. 1, c. 3, B9.102a). The quotation marks should be removed from the Borgnet text.

42 De Anima, Γ. 1, 425a27.

43 Following Aristotle, St. Thomas sees in this the reason for the greatest kinds of false judgment the imagination can make. S. Thomae, in De An., III, 6, n. 663. Cf. also S. Alberti M . ., De Anima, III, tr. I, c. 8, B5.327b.

44 In De Anima, III, 1, nos. 577, 578.


46 Unde cum omnia accidentia comparentur ad substantiam sicut forma ad materiam, et cujuslibet accidentis ratio dependeat a substantia, impossibile est aliquam talem formam a substantia separari. Sed accidentia adveniunt substantiae quodam ordine. Nam primo advenit ei quantitas, deinde qualitas, deinde passiones et motus. Unde quantitas potest intelligi in substantia ante quam intelligentur in ea qualitates sensibiles, a quibus dicitur materia sensibilis: et sic secundum rationem suae
Substantiae non dependet quantitas a materia sensibili, sed intelligibili tantum. Substantia enim remotis accidentibus non remanet nisi intellectu comprehensibilis, eo quod sensibiles potentiae non pertingunt usque ad substantiae comprehensionem (S. Thomae, in Boet. de Trin., V, 8 resp., ed Mandonnet, p. 112).


48 Nec differt utrum singularia sint sensibilia vel intelligibilia. Singularia quidem sensibilia sunt sicut circuli aerei et lignei. Intelligibilia singularia sunt sicut circuli mathematici. Quod autem in mathematicis considerentur aliqua singularia, ex hoc patet, quia considerantur ibi plura unius speciei, sicut plures lineae aequales, et plures figurae similes. Dicuntur autem intelligibilia hujusmodi singularia, secundum quod absque sensu comprehenduntur per solam phantasiam, quae quandoque intellectus vocatur secundum illud in tertio de Anima: "Intellectus passivus corruptibilis est" (S. Thomae, in Met., VII, 10, n. 1494).

48a In his commentary on the De Anima (II, tr. 8, c. 6, B5.240b sqq.) St. Albert raised the interesting question whether there be one mover of the whole order of things sensible, even as there is the agent intellect for the intelligible order. The opinion of those he calls "modemi," that light is that one mover, he brands as altogether ridiculous. But the older Augustinian difficulty had been how can anything material at all be the cause of something spiritual; and to the great authority of Plato and St. Augustine he pays deference. Cf.: Alii autem antiquiores hunc dixerunt, quod virtus animae est agens eae intentiones spirituales: et isti sunt qui dixerunt potissimum virtutem sensus esse activam et non passivam: ... (B5.241b). Opinio autem secunda est multo probabilior, licet modemomm pauci teneant earn: erat enim illa Platonis et etiam Augustini et multorum aliorum magnorum virorum. Tamen sine praejudicio aut ego non intelligo eos, aut ipsi falsum dixerunt B5.243b). St. Albert, surely under the influence of Aristotle and of the great commentators, rejects the opinion because the sensible is already in act and because the sense is passive in its being moved by its object. Now in St. Thomas the common sense has practically nothing that would suggest a comparison with the agent intellect. But as St. Albert had conceived the agent intellect, the common sense almost demanded comparison with the agent intellect, for each was conceived as the unum formalisaimum in its own border, and each was a formal source of descent; the one of sensible, the other of intelligible forms. Hence later in the De Anima (II, tr. 4, c. li, B5.313a "et hoc est quod intendit dicere Augustinus etc.") St. Albert explained in terms of the doctrine of formalities that St. Augustine’s teaching should be assimilated to St. Albert’s own description of the common sense.

49 S. Thomae, Summa Theol., I, q. 57, a. i resp. (cf. ST I. 77. 3 ad 4); Cont. Gent., II, 100, ed. Leonina manualis p 224b.

50 Cont. Gent., I, 61, p. 56b.

51 Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2, and the resp.

52 De Anima, Γ. 2, 427a10. We may remark that this is not an application of mathematics to physics such as would yield an intermediate science; rather it is a use of mathematics in an allegorical or anagogical sense, so that the example of Aristotle is in a class with, e. g., Richard of St. Victor’s description of the four comers of the Ark of
the Covenant, or with Henning's gustatory tetrahedron described in the psychology books.

53 S. Thomae, in De An., III, 4, n. 609; Cf. also, nos. 610 sqq.


56 . . . inquantum sensus communis comparatur ad sensus proprios ut quoddam medium, sicut centrum comparatur ad lineas terminatas ad ipsum (S. Thomae, De An., III, 12, no. 768). Et licet sensus exteriiores sint plures, tamen ultimum, ad quod terminantur immutationes horum sensuum, est unum; quia est quasi medietas una inter omnes sensus, sicut centrum ad quod terminantur omnes lineae, quasi ad unum medium (Op. cit., no. 773).

57 . . . sicut est terminus unus, terminum dicens ultimum plurium linearum que in idem conveniunt, quale est circuli centrum ad quod omnes que circumferentia recte conveniunt, quod subjecto quidem unum est signum et impartibile, eo autem quod multorum terminus est, multa est (ioannis Grammatici, Super III de Anima, ed. DeCorte 71. 27-31).


59 . . . , sed ista virtus est una et multa, ut punctus, qui est centrum circuli, quando ab eo fuerint ductae multae lineae a centro ad circumferentiam et hoc intendebat, cum dicit punctus unius, hoc est punctus, qui continentur ab una linea (Averrois Cordubensis, super II de Anima, text. et com. 149, ed Venet. apud Iuntas [1550-52] fol. 156rb).

60 Tertia ratio communitatis est, quod sensus proprii referuntur ad ipsum ut ad unum centrum omnium sensuum, ut dicit Avicenna (S. Alberti M., S. de Creat., II, q. 35, a. 2, B35.312b). Cf.: op. cit., q. 36, a. 2 sol. B35.321b; De Somno et Vigilia., I, tr. 2, c. 1, B9. 138a; De Sensu et Sensato, tr. 3, c. 6, B9.91b.

61 S. Alberti M., De Anima, II, tr. 4, c. 11, B5.311ab.

62 S. Thomae, in De An., III, 12, n. 774.

63 S. Thomae, in Boet. de Trin., VI, 2 resp., ed. Mandonnet p. 182. In this article St. Thomas pushes human knowledge back to that which is its ultimate principle, the sense; and the name "apprehension," which expresses technically the simple acceptance of an object of cognition, is applicable not only to the first act of intellect, but also to the knowledge of the external sense and the imagination. There is no question, however, of simple apprehension's being principle and prior in relation to judgment, the term and posterior; e. g., Compositio autem et divisio posterior est consideratione eius quod quid est, quod est eius principium (Cont. Gent., I, 58, ed. Leonina man., p. 54b); Intellectus autem noster, apprehendendo incomplexa, nondum pertingit ad ultimum suam perfectionem, quia adhuc est in potentia respectu compositionis et divisionis: sicut et in naturalibus simplicia sunt in potentia respectu commixtorum, et partes respectu totius (Op. cit., I, 59, p. 55b).


66 E. g., Summa Theol., I. q. 78, a. 4 ad 1.

67 S. Thomae, in De An., III, 13, n. 793.

68 Primo ponit rationem termini; dicens, quod terminus dicitur quod est ultimum cujuslibet rei, ita quod nihil de primo terminato est extra ipsum terminum; et omnia quae sunt ejus, continentur intra ipsum (S. Thomae, in Met., V, 19, n. 1044; cf. Quodl., I, 10, 22 ad 1).

69 S. Thomae, in Met., loc. cit., n. 1045.

70 Ibid., n. 1046.

71 S. Thomae, in I Sent., 43, 1, 1 resp.

72 Alio modo possunt intelligi convenientia, ita quod convenient in aliquo ordine, et sic attenditur proportio inter materiam et formam, faciens et factum, et talis proportio requiritur inter cognoscentem et cognoscibile; cum cognoscibile sit quasi actus potentiae cognoscentis . . . (S. Thomae, in Boet. de Trin., I, 2 ad 3, ed. Mandonnet, p. 33). Ad quartum dicendum quod intellectus et intelligibile sunt unius generis sicut potentia et actus (ibid. ad 4). Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut sensus in actu est sensibile in actu, ut dicitur, non ita quod ipsa vis sensitiva sit ipsa similitudo sensibilis quae est in sensu, sed quia ex utroque fit unum, sicut ex actu et potentia; ita et intellectus in actu dicitur esse intellectum in actu., non quod substantia intellectus sit ipsa similitudo per quam intelligit, sed quia Ila similitudo est forma ejus (Summa Theol., I, q. 55, a. 1 ad 2).

73 Si autem est terminus cognitionis, oportet quod sit rei terminus, quia cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam (S. Thomae, loc. cit. n. 1048).

74 S. Thomae, De Verit., I, 9 resp.


76 S. Thomae, in I Sent., 19, 5, I resp. and ad 7. These texts are famous. Of the many studies based on them we refer to one of the most recent and penetrating, Gerald B. Phelan, "Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum," Mediaeval Studies, I (1989), 11-22.

77 Aristotelis, De Somno, 2, 455a15-17.

Probat minorem dicens quod in unoquoque sensu particulari est aliquid proprium, et aliquid commune, consequens ad ipsum proprium, et est eis sua propria operatio, ut visui videre, et auditui audire, et quaedam communis potentia sentiendi est, consequens ad omnes sensus partiales .... Probat consequens duabus rationibus. Quorum prima talis est. aliquo sentimos nos videre: sed non sensu proprio. ergo aliquid est sensus communis sentiens (S. Thomae, in De Somno et Vigilia, 3, ed. Piana [Romae, 1570], sections c and d, fol. 30va). Cf. in De An., II. 18, no. 390. Also . . . a quo etiam percipiuntur actiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in

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qua immutacione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutacione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit (Summa Theol., I, q. 78, a. 4 ad 2). Cf .... quia cujuslibet potentiae animae virtus est determinata ad objectum suum; uncle et ejus actio primo et principaliter in objectum tendit. In ea vero quibus in objectum tendit, non potest nisi per quandam reditioinem, sicut videmus, quod visio primo dirigitur in colorum; sed in actum visionis suae non dirigitur nisi per quandam reditioinem, dum videndo colorum videt se videre. Sed ista reditio incompleta est in sensu, . . . (De Verit., 10, 9 resp.).

78 St. Albert seems to have extended this knowledge to the perception of the movements of any of the interior powers, De Somno et Vigilia, I, 1, 2, B9.125a.

79 Si autem motus vaporis fuit modicus, non solum imaginatio remanet libera, sed etiam ipse sensus communis ex parte solvitur; ita quod homo judicat interdum in dormiendo, ea quae videt, somnia esse, quasi dijudicans inter res et rerum similiuclines. Sed tamen ex aliqua parte remanet sensus communis ligatus (S. Thomae, Summa Theol., I, q. 84. a. 8 ad 2).